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ESTATE PLANNING
PITFALLS OF ESTATE PLANNING REVISITED
Samuel D. Thurman*
The following article is an address delivered by Dean Thurman
to the members of the San Diego County Bar Association who were
guests of the First National Bank of San Diego on May 14, 1964.
Dean Thurman had been the guest speaker at a similar gathering
some ten years prior, shortly after the passage of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
Dean Thurman outlines a few of the pitfalls encountered in estate
planning under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, as amended to the
date of the address, with particular emphasis on changes brought
about by the court decisions and Regulations promzulgated since
1954. He specifically discusses additional problems encountered
where a community property system is superimposed on the federal
taxing scheme.
Because the opening remarks were directed to the particular group
assembled, they have been omitted from this article. Case and article
citations which were parenthetically included in the text of the
address have been relegated to footnotes.
PITFALL NUMBER 1: INACTION
Ten years ago, I referred to inaction as probably the most com-
mon pitfall in estate planning, or more properly, a pitfall stemming
from lack of planning. The difficulty is that many clients may be
failing to do things that should be done and be completely unaware
of their failure. Inaction in business soon shows up, whereas inaction
in estate planning is often first discovered at death, and frequently
at a time many years thereafter. In addition, the businessman who
does not plan ahead can often compensate for his mistakes whereas
the failure to plan an estate is usually irrevocable.
The distinction is also one between the lifetime accumulation of
an estate and its ultimate disposition. Most men gradually become
knowledgeable in the field of income tax and in the solution of
business problems generally. Few, however, know much about the
problems of planning an estate, many of these problems being ex-
ceedingly complicated and many requiring a knowledge of estate
taxation. Their families may find that they have to live for many
years with the mistakes made in failing to plan properly.
* Dean, College of Law, University of Utah; A.B., University of Utah, 1935; LL.B.,
Stanford University, 1939.
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There are many reasons for this inaction on the part of all of us,
for attorneys themselves are certainly not immune. We often state
that we will wait until a major business crisis has been passed or
that we will wait until a family problem is solved or until the family
needs are a little clearer. Life, of course, has a way of presenting
constant, albeit different, problems, and it is a rare individual who
ever reaches a state where he can say there are no uncertainties in
the future. At no point do we ever feel that a will, even with care-
fully drawn provisions, can ever be an adequate substitute for our
own presence. Consequently, there is a human tendency to postpone
the planning of an estate until a more fortuitous future time.
There are also the immediate pressures of daily life. Most of us
require deadlines in order to get work done, and few of us have a
definite date of death before us. It is interesting to compare the
individual who is more or less aware of impending death. You can
be certain that he gives estate planning a much higher priority on
his list of things to be done than do the rest of us.
PITFALL NUMBER 2: PIECEMEAL PLANNING
Most of us probably are not guilty of complete inaction in plan-
ning our estates. A more common pitfall is that of piecemeal plan-
ning. Over the period of a lifetime the average individual probably
has purchased a number of life insurance policies with varying
settlement agreements and without much regard to the overall pic-
tire he is putting together. He probably has made a will or two,
has put a number of miscellaneous pieces of property in joint ten-
ancy, usually without thinking of the legal consequences, and has
made a gift of other property either outright or in trust. He may
have entered into partnership agreements that will play an impor-
tant part in the estate that he has accumulated. Contracts to sell or
buy closely held corporate stock are common, and employment
contracts, pension and profit-sharing plans, and social security bene-
fits all play an increasingly important part in today's estates. No
person planning an estate can do an adequate job if he does not
secure this overall picture. Coordination of all of these arrangements
entered into over a period of years on a piecemeal basis is essential
for effective planning that will meet your client's desires and the
needs of his family.
PITFALL NUMBER 3: FAILURE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
INTER Vivos GIFTS
Federal income and estate tax savings can be effected by making
inter vivos gifts. These tax savings, however, are only possible where
the gifts are irrevocable. Revocable trusts are frequently set up for
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the convenience of the grantor in order to shift the burden of man-
aging property or to make a trial run, so to speak, on a testamentary
trust. The fact that they are revocable, however, means that no gift
tax is payable, no income tax is avoided, and the principal is still
taxed in the grantor's estate at the time of his death.
An irrevocable gift, on the other hand, can shift income taxes to
those in lower brackets and can avoid estate tax, albeit at the price
of possible gift taxes. Such gifts may be made outright or may be
made in trust. The gift in trust can have many advantages, tax and
otherwise. It can provide management of the assets and flexibility
to meet family needs, both with reference to the income and to the
principal. In addition, if the trust instrument is appropriately
drafted, it can introduce at least a third taxpayer, the trust itself,
into the picture in addition to the settlor and the beneficiary. The
trust can become an income taxpayer if income is to be accumulated
for future distribution.
The trust principal may also be removed from the grantor's tax-
able estate, unless the gift is made in contemplation of death, and
estate tax may also be avoided at the later death of the beneficiary.
This latter advantage is not possible when the initial gift is made
outright.
Short Term Trusts
By the use of the short term irrevocable trust, income tax savings
may be effected. Under the Internal Revenue Code such trust must
be irrevocable for at least ten years or until the happening of an
event that is not likely to occur within ten years. One important
exception to this rule is that the trust is effective to transfer income
for tax purposes when it is to last for the beneficiary's lifetime,
regardless of the beneficiary's life expectancy.
The grantor must not retain the power to change the beneficiary
or to alter the beneficial enjoyment of the trust income or to control
the trust primarily for his own benefit. It is also important to make
sure that the income is to be paid to or accumulated for the benefit
of someone else. The income may not be used for the grantor's own
economic benefit, such as the discharge of his legal obligations or
the payment of life insurance premiums on his own life.
The short term trust is not effective in saving estate tax to any
great extent. The trust will either terminate at the grantor's death,
in which case the entire trust property will be included in his gross
estate, or he will have a reversionary interest that will in all proba-
bility be worth almost as much as the present value of the property.
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A gift tax may be payable, the value of the gift depending upon
the duration of the trust and the value of the property. The use of
the annual gift tax exclusion, available if the income of the trust is
to be distributed each year, and the grantor's lifetime exemption,
applicable even 'to gift of a future interest, may eliminate most, if
not all, of the gift tax.
The short term trust is frequently used by individuals in high
income tax brackets even though they do not have substantial
amounts of property. The person of substantial wealth is more fre-
quently interested in escaping estate tax as well as saving income
tax and consequently often prefers the permanent gift in trust.
One pitfall to bear in mind in connection with all irrevocable
trusts is the State Street Trust case.' If the settlor names himself as
trustee or as one of the trustees, normally fiduciary powers over
investment or distribution may have the effect of including the prop-
erty in his gross estate at death.
PITFALL NUMBER 4: JOINT TENANCY
Many taxpayers make the mistake of failing to separate commu-
nity property and separate property. There are various presumptions
in the code that assist in a determination as to which type of prop-
erty is involved, but it will frequently be advisable to have a hus-
band and wife enter into formal written agreements concerning
their property.
This is particularly true with reference to one situation commonly
encountered, the purchase of corporation stock with community
property funds. Most corporations will not register stock as commu-
nity property and will insist that it be registered in the names of
individuals or, as most brokers seem to do without much thought
given to the consequences, in joint tenancy with right of survivor-
ship. It is in this situation where a formal agreement making it dear
that the property is to remain community property becomes impor-
tant. California does have a liberal rule which allows the parties
to come forward at a later date and state that they did not under-
stand that the property was to become true joint tenancy and that
they still considered it community property. This is the Tomaier
doctrine.2 Internal Revenue agents are not happy with a rule of this
kind and taxpayers frequently find it necessary to go to court if they
claim an alleged oral understanding that the parties intended the
property to remain community. A written agreement will usually
obviate this problem.
1 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
2 Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
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But what are the main disadvantages in commuting community
property to joint tenancy?
In the first place, the surviving wife will have the burden of proof
as to her contribution, which she may not be able to sustain. In such
case the entire property will be included in the husband's gross
estate.
Disadvantage number two is the difficulty of planning an estate
where the property is in joint tenancy. The surviving wife will take
the property outright and any such property will by-pass the will.
There is nothing for the will to "bite" on and there can, therefore,
be no planned widow's election. The husband cannot in such case
leave the wife a life estate only, either in his own half or in his
wife's. Any incidental probate savings at the husband's death (this
is frequently the objective of individuals who place property in joint
tenancy) may be far outweighed by such disadvantages.
In the third place, if the wife does succeed in proving that the
joint tenancy was community property originally and that each
spouse, therefore, contributed one-half so that only half will be
included in the husband's gross estate, there will be no stepped-up
income tax basis as to the one-half not included in his estate. The
treatment is different from that accorded community property and
this becomes a major consideration today with inflated property the
general rule in most estates. If the property is left as community
property, only one-half will be included in the gross estate for estate
tax purposes, but both halves will get a stepped-up basis as of the
date of death, or other applicable valuation date, for income tax
purposes.
PITFALL NUMBER 5: FAILURE TO PLAN WITH LIFE ESTATES
Traditionally, the most common estate planning device has been
the life estate to the wife, remainder to the children, type of dis-
position. Before the marital deduction, this was certainly true, and
even since 1948 its popularity has continued. Separate and apart
from estate tax considerations, husbands frequently want to leave
their property in this manner. Why?
Husbands are willing to leave to their wives the entire income
from all their property, including various powers of invasion, but
are frequently reluctant to have any of the property go outright.
The reasons for this are obvious: the fear that the wife's lack of
business experience, or presumed lack of such experience, will re-
sult in mismanagement and loss of property; the fear that she will
be importuned by relatives and others if she has unfettered control
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over the property; the desire to eliminate probate at the wife's
death; and no doubt the concern of some that a second husband may
come along and take over the property the first husband spent a
lifetime acquiring.
With reference to separate personal property, no problem is en-
countered by the husband in so disposing of his property. In fact,
the husband can completely deprive the wife of any interest in such
property; he may leave it outright to third persons and deprive her
of any claim thereto. In this respect I believe California has been
derelict in the protection of wives, except in the case of quasi-com-
munity property. Individuals who come to California from non-
community property jurisdictions frequently bring with them sub-
stantial amounts of property acquired over a period of a lifetime.
If this property stemmed from the husband's earnings, and would
have been community property had the spouses been domiciled in
California at the time of its acquisition, at the prior death of the
husband one-half must go to the wife; he does not have a power of
testamentary disposition over that half. This means that he can
neither leave that half outright to a third person nor give his wife
a life estate only in that half. It is now clear, however, that where
the wife dies first she has no power of testamentary disposition over
such property.
As to other separate property brought into the state or acquired
while living within the state, the wife in California has no such
protection. If the husband inherited the property before coming to
California, the wife gave up all rights in it by way of dower and
statutory substitutes when the parties left the separate property state.
The non-community property states generally do not distinguish
between inherited and earned property owned by the husband during
his lifetime. In California, where separate property is involved, the
wife gets better protection in the event of divorce than she does
upon the husband's death; she may be able to get substantial ali-
mony rights that would be a charge against his separate property.
With the increasing number of individuals moving to California
each year, on the average the wife probably lacks protection in much
of the husband's property.
In sharp contrast to the separate property states, all of the com-
munity property states preclude the husband from making a testa-
mentary gift of more than one-half of the community property to
someone other than the surviving wife. This limitation applies not
merely to outright testamentary gifts to third persons, but it also
precludes the husband from leaving the wife's half to her in trust;
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she need not accept a life estate to her with a remainder to the chil-
dren. The husband cannot give away the remainder interest in his
wife's half of the community property without her consent, yet this
is precisely the result that many husbands desire. With reference to
the husband's half, this device can be used. With reference to the
wife's half, she can say, "I will not accept that; I will take the prop-
erty outright."
Estate Tax Consequences
Where separate property is involved, the husband has the choice
of paying an estate tax on the entire amount of the property at his
death with nothing taxable at the wife's subsequent death. This can
be done by giving the wife a life estate only in the entire property.
If he prefers, he can provide for an estate tax on half the property
at his death and half at the death of the wife. This can be done by
giving her a life estate in half with a disposition in the other half
that qualifies for the marital deduction. Whichever route is taken,
the entire estate eventually is subject to estate tax in one or the other
estate.
Compare the situation with reference to community property.
Whether the husband's half is left to the wife outright or whether
she is given a life estate only, the federal estate tax consequences
are the same; only one-half of the community property is taxable at
his death, her half of the community property escaping tax at that
time. Of course, at her later death it makes a difference whether she
received her husband's half outright or received only a life estate.
Suppose, however, that the husband attempts to leave all of the
community property in trust with a life estate to the wife and re-
mainder to the children. Under this type of provision it is still true
that only one-half of the community property is taxed at his death.
This was decided a number of years ago when the Commissioner
claimed unsuccessfully that the entire community proprety should
be taxed in the husband's estate in such case.' There is, of course,
no problem of securing a marital deduction when community prop-
erty is involved and the half to which the wife is entitled will escape
estate tax at his death.
At first blush, it seems that any tax at the death of the wife has
been escaped in this case. Half of the property was taxed when
the husband died. Since the wife has only a life estate, possibly in-
cluding some limited powers of invasion, it will not be taxable at
her death. Actually, however, what is the situation? The husband
has given his half of the community property to the wife and the
3 Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939).
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children. There will be no tax on this half at the subsequent death
of the wife inasmuch as a life estate given by a third person is not
taxable. As to the wife's half, however, she has really given this to
herself and to her children by acquiescing in the husband's will.
Instead of claiming her half outright, as she is entitled to do, she
has really made a present gift of a remainder interest in her half of
the community property and the cases are clear that a gift tax would
be then payable. The wife has made the gift of her half just as
dearly as if she had put the property in trust directly. The value of
the remainder interest which she has given will, of course, depend
upon her age.
Furthermore, her entire interest put in trust in this fashion will be
included in her gross estate at her death under Internal Revenue
Code Section 2036. This is a reserved life estate situation where the
entire value of the property, not merely the remainder interest or
her life estate, will be included in her gross estate with some credit
for the gift tax paid on the remainder interest. Thus there is appar-
ently no community property advantage in such a situation. It would
seem that the end result is the same as in the case of separate prop-
erty where the marital deduction portion would be taxable at the
wife's death. I am certain this is what Congress desired-half of the
tax when the husband dies, the other half when the wife dies.
The Widow's Election
But, and this is the interesting point in a community property
jurisdiction today, suppose that the husband adds in his will the
familiar clause stating that all of the community property, his half
and his wife's half, is to go into a testamentary trust, life estate to
the wife, remainder to the children, but if the wife elects to take
her half outright instead of leaving it in trust, then she is to get
nothing from his half of the community property. She is to be cut
off from any interest in the husband's half if she elects not to go
along with the trust he has set up, even thought it takes in her half
of the community as well as his.
Why are such provisions commonly encountered? In effect, after
death a second look at the husband's estate and at the wife's needs
is afforded by this election device. There is also the old reason:
added pressure is put on the wife to leave her half in trust and keep
only a life estate so that third persons, possibly later husbands, will
not get their hands on it. There is the feeling in many cases that the
wife is much better off with her half in trust so far as management
is concerned. In addition, it seems that there are now good tax
reasons for such a provision, with respect to the gift tax, the estate
tax, and the income tax.
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In the Siegel case,' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that under such a provision, the gift of a remainder interest to
the children deemed to have been made by the wife would not be
taxable to the extent that she received consideration from the hus-
band. In this case, the consideration would be a life estate in his half
of the community property. It now becomes a bargain transaction.
The husband says, "I will give you a life estate in my half of the
community property if you will give our children a remainder inter-
est in your half." This, in effect, leaves the wife with a life estate in
the entire property. The difference in value between the life estate
which the wife gets from the husband and the remainder interest in
her half depends upon the age of the wife. The Regulations point
out, for example, that if the widow is age fifty-one the life estate
and the remainder interest are approximately equal in value. In such
case no gift tax is due.
What is the estate tax situation? In the absence of the type of
provision which forces the wife to an election, there is an estate tax
on the wife's half of the community property at her death, but
where the widow is forced to an election, the Vardell case' held
that the consideration argument is equally valid. Section 2036, which
would tax a reserved life estate to the wife, recognizes that this
value is reduced to the extent that the wife received consideration
for conveying the remainder and reserving a life estate. Inasmuch
as the entire value of the wife's property would be includable under
Section 2036, and the consideration given from the husband's half
of the community, namely a life estate to the wife, would never
quite equal the value of the wife's interest, some federal estate tax
would be payable. However, it would be less than a tax on the wife's
entire interest, depending upon her age. If the husband, on the other
hand, gives additional consideration, such as a part of his separate
property, for her acquiescence in the trust there may be sufficient
consideration moving to her to equal the value of her community
property half with a consequent complete elimination of estate tax
at her death.
Needless to say, this type of consideration makes the Commis-
sioner unhappy. In all probability, Congress had in mind considera-
tion that would still be in the wife's estate when she died, a substi-
tute for the property she gave away. Here the consideration is a life
estate in the husband's half which will be worthless when she dies,
with nothing to be taxed at that time unless there is unspent income
from the trust. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said
4 Comm'r v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
5 Estate of Vardell v. Comm'r, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962)
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that the life estate is consideration nonetheless, and the fact that it
becomes worthless at the wife's death is immaterial. If a different
result is desired tax-wise, it is up to Congress to do something about
it. This brings about a decided advantage in a community property
state. A similar plan will work in a non-community property state
only if both spouses have property. In the usual case, with the hus-
band earning the income, it takes community property to make the
plan succeed.
When we turn to the income tax consequences of the widow's
election to take under the will, we possibly enter what Judge Minor
Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit described as a "taxpayer's utopia."'
There is a definite possibility that the income received by the wife
from the husband's half of the community property will be received
tax-free, or substantially so. The law is clear that a purchaser of a
life estate may amortize the purchase price during his life against
the income received. A taxpayer may even be so bold as to claim
that the first income received should be treated as a recovery of his
purchase price and that only the subsequent income would be subject
to income tax. The purchase price in the case of the widow's election
is the remainder interest in her half of the community property
which she transferred to her children. Thus the widow has pur-
chased a life estate and is entitled to amortize this cost.
As an offset to this advantage, the Commissioner may claim that
the transfer of the remainder interest is a taxable exchange under
the income tax with a consequent capital gains tax. However, where
this transfer is effected immediately after the husband's death, there
will probably be no capital gain due to the stepped-up basis provi-
sions of Section 1014(b) (6).
PITFALL NUMBER 6: FEAR OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
We have talked about the life estate to the wife, remainder to the
children, situation as perhaps the most common estate planning
device. Today most testators want to take added precautions to see
that the wife is protected in the event the income is not sufficient.
At the same time they want, so far as possible, to avoid an estate tax
at her subsequent death. This is true, of course, only where there is
no claim to a marital deduction in the husband's estate. In order to
accomplish these objectives, the husband has several alternatives.
Where the property is placed in trust, it has become increasingly
popular to give the trustee broad discretionary powers to distribute




maintenance or support, or even for her general welfare. Even a
provision this broad will not have untoward tax consequences, and
such a power when vested in an independent trustee will give the
wife the protection desired. In addition, the trustee can be author-
ized to use income and principal to pay all bills of the wife rather
than to distribute money directly to her in the event of her ill-health
or incapacity.
In lieu of such broad powers, or in addition thereto, powers of
appointment, including powers to invade capital, can be given to
the wife herself. Where these are donated powers, that is powers
with reference to the husband's separate property or to his half of
the community property, Section 2041 is extremely liberal in permit-
ting substantial flexibility while at the same time imposing no estate
tax at the death of the wife.
One of the most neglected estate planning devices is the power
of appointment. To many lawyers the field is a hazy one, filled with
various pitfalls such as the rule against perpetuities, and any subject
not thoroughly understood is suspect. Consequently, there is a reluc-
tance to create powers of appointment in a client's estate, powers
which might frequently come closer to achieving non-tax objectives
than any other device and, in addition, save substantial amounts of
taxes. Although a power of appointment can be complicated, it need
not be and often the most advantageous results can be obtained by
the giving of a dear, simple power to dispose of property.
In the first place, an understanding of terminology is essential.
Although property lawyers and tax lawyers do not always define
powers of appointment in the same way, both do use the same names
in designating the parties. The person who creates the power is
called the donor of the power. The one to whom the power is given
is the donee of the power, the wife in this case. The person to whom
the property is appointed is the appointee. The one who takes, if
the donee of the power does not appoint, is the taker in default of
appointment. The most typical case would be: A by will, leaves
property to B for life with a power in B to appoint the remainder
by will, but if B does not appoint then the property is to go to C
and his heirs. If B exercises this testamentary power and appoints to
D, A is the donor, B is the donee, D is the appointee, and C is the
taker in default of appointment who in this case, of course, would
take nothing.
Compare this disposition with the one more commonly encoun-
tered where A leaves property to B for life, remainder to C with
no power in B to alter the disposition. Here it is dear that B has
1965]
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only a life estate and both his interest and C's are testamentary gifts
from A. There is no federal estate tax upon the death of B and this
has traditionally been the most common estate planning device, espe-
dally prior to the introduction of the marital deduction. Even today
it is frequently advisable for A to leave at least a portion of his
property in this fashion, this part not qualifying for the marital
deduction in the case of separate property.
But what is the tax picture when B is given some kind of power
to dispose of the remainder interest in Blackacre? Does it make a
difference whether it is a general or a more limited power? Does B
have to exercise the power before there are federal estate tax con-
sequences? These and other questions come to the fore when we
enter the powers of appointment area.
In the first place, no property over which the decedent has a
donated power of appointment is included in his gross estate unless
it is a general power, defined as one exercisable in favor of the dece-
dent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate; in other
words, one that can be exercised directly or indirectly for the benefit
of the decedent. The general power may be one exercisable either
during life or by will, not necessarily both, and results in tax
whether exercised or not. It is important to notice that Section 2041
is not dependent upon a lifetime transfer of an interest in property
under Sections 2035, 2036, 2037, and 2038. Reserved powers over
property owned previously by the decedent would not come under
Section 2041 but might be taxed under some other section.
Usually the donee of the power has some interest in the property,
such as a life estate, in addition to his power to appoint during life
or at death, but it is possible to have a power of appointment over
property in which the donee of the power has no property interest.
It should also be observed that under Section 2041 a power to con-
sume, invade, or appropriate property may constitute a power of
appointment and in certain cases may qualify as a taxable general
power.
Section 2041 provides, however, and this is important, that a
power given the wife to invade the principal for her own benefit is
not to be deemed a taxable general power if this power of invasion
is limited by an ascertainable standard which can, in fact, be very
broad. For example, the Code provides that a standard relating to
the health, education, support, or maintenance of the wife would
not be deemed a general power. Here we have a very useful device
whereby the donee of the power can be given substantial control
over a trust in addition to her life estate and still have the bequest
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from the donor treated, for tax purposes, as though she had been
given only a life estate with no power to invade. The ascertainable
standard rule is not a difficult one to satisfy and the donee of the
power can have wide latitude with reference to invasion of the
corpus.
Another increasingly popular provision that enables the wife to
be given considerable discretion and yet not be taxed at her death is
the right annually to withdraw $5,000.00 or five per cent of the
value of the trust property without limit as to use, such right to
lapse at the end of each annual period if not exercised. Under such
a power, there will be included in the wife's estate only the amount
of principal that she could have withdrawn at the time of her death,
in addition, of course, to any amounts actually withdrawn that had
not been consumed. The lapsed rights of prior years will not be
taxed even though technically they constitute gifts of remainder in-
terests to the children with a reservation of a life estate in the wife.
Frequently, a husband desires to give his wife some freedom in
withdrawing limited amounts of capital while at the same time rec-
ognizing that this may not always be an adequate protection to her.
The independent trustee can in such cases be given unlimited discre-
tionary power to invade capital on her behalf where necessary and
the tax at her death will still be avoided.
PITFALL NUMBER 7: THE MARITAL DEDUCTION-
USE AND MISUSE
Although the chief purpose of the Revenue Act of 1948, which
introduced the marital deduction for individuals having separate
property, was said to be that of extending to married residents of
all states the tax benefits enjoyed in community property states,
it is doubtful whether this objective was fully achieved. In a com-
mon law state, for example, where the husband owns all of the
property the parties cannot really achieve a position equivalent to
that in a community property state without paying a substantial gift
tax.
In a non-community property state if the wife who has no prop-
erty dies first, there is, of course, no marital deduction. Although
there is no tax when the wife dies, there is a full tax when the hus-
band dies and the benefit of one $60,000.00 exemption is lost, the
wife having no estate. The community property states, on the other
hand, have a built-in marital deduction: when the wife dies, half of
the community property is taxed but she can, either by bypassing
the husband or by giving him a life estate only in her half, avoid a
tax on her half at his death. In California, it is particularly impor-
1965]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
tant for the wife to have a will in order to prevent the entire com-
munity property from being taxed at the husband's subsequent death.
In the event of intestacy, all of her community interest will pass to
her husband, unlike the law in some of the other community prop-
erty states.
Owners of separate property, whether in California or elsewhere,
should be fully aware of the tax savings possible by use of the mari-
tal deduction. This deduction is available only to married persons
who own separate property and it is allowed when property passes
to the surviving spouse under certain prescribed conditions. These
conditions generally insure that the property qualifying for the mari-
tal deduction will be subject to estate tax at the death of the sur-
viving spouse. The maximum marital deduction is limited to fifty
per cent of the adjusted gross estate.
A pitfall to be avoided is the use of the marital deduction in cases
where the tax saving at the death of the first spouse will be less than
the additional tax at the death of the survivor. This can happen if
the survivor owns other property and will be in a higher tax bracket,
or if the property used to obtain the marital deduction is likely to
increase in value during the survivor's lifetime. In some instances a
full tax payable in the husband's estate with a non-taxable life estate
in the wife is preferable.
The Stapf Case
In December 1963 the United States Supreme Court, which does
not hear many tax cases these days, handed down a decision of in-
terest to the community property states." The husband died leaving
both community and separate property. By will he put his wife to an
election, requiring her to acquiesce in a trust in all the community
property for the benefit of their children in return for a substantial
interest in his separate property. The wife elected to take under the
will and claimed a marital deduction. The government contended
that the value of the community property relinquished by the wife
was in excess of the separate party given by husband and claimed
that having received no net benefit she was not entitled to a marital
deduction. The executor argued for the "plain meaning of the
statute" and the Fifth Circuit upheld his contention. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that no marital deduction could be taken.
This decision has important consequences in a community property
state where the husband has separate property which might other-
wise qualify for the marital deduction. The widow's election for-
mula must be watched carefully in this case.




PITFALL NUMBER 8: CONFUSION RE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LIFE INSURANCE
Much confusion abounds as to the nature of this type of property.
This was even more true ten years ago. In fact, the paucity of au-
thority with reference to community property life insurance led me
in 1957 to devote a good part of six months to research in this field.
I concluded that there were a great many questions under the 1954
Code that required court answer.' Several of these have been passed
upon since that time. For example, many taxpayers contended that
where the husband had taken out insurance on his life but had paid
the premiums with community funds, there would be no estate tax
at the prior death of the wife. It is now fairly dear that this is not
so; the wife's half interest in the community property life insurance
is taxable. Her interest is not taxable under the insurance section,
Section 2042, which applies only in the case of insurance on the life
of the deceased but under Section 2033 dealing with miscellaneous
property in which the decedent had an interest. The tax would be
on the replacement value of her interest, not the proceeds value.
The difficulty in analyzing community property life insurance
stems in large part from the failure to distinguish rights in the pol-
icy during life and rights in its proceeds following the insured's
death, as well as from a lack of understanding of the methods of
transferring life insurance interests. A further source of confusion
arises from the fact that although occasionally the same individual
may possess all rights in the policy as well as in its proceeds, these
rights may be, and usually are, divided in varying combinations. A
system of community property compounds the difficulty by effecting
a basic and pervasive division of rights and ownership interests as
between the spouses.
In recognition of the fact that life insurance is but another form
of property the California cases are dear that such contracts may be
separate property, community property or mixed, depending upon
the source of the premium payments. Thus, to the extent of deter-
mining whether a policy is community property or not, the test of
premium payment continues effective, despite its abandonment by
Congress as an ultimate criterion of taxability.
Where the wife is named beneficiary and the husband reserves,
but does not exercise, the right to change beneficiaries, the entire
proceeds go to her at the husband's death, one-half as a gift from
her husband. As to such gifts, her consent in writing is of course not
8 Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life Insur-
ance, 9 STAN. L. REv. 239 (1957).
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required, but where the husband has, without receiving considera-
tion, named someone other than his wife as beneficiary without her
written consent, the gift violates Section 172 of the California Civil
Code.
The California courts have consistently held that the gift in such
cases is not a nullity but is voidable at the option of the wife, fol-
lowing the insured's death, to the extent of one-half the policy
proceeds. The doctrine that a wife in California can claim one-half
of the proceeds of a community life insurance policy as against the
named beneficiary, even where the policy makes no reference to her
interest and names only her husband as owner and where all deal-
ings have been between the husband and the insurance company,
was first enunciated in 1923. It came as a shock to many who owned
insurance as well as to insurance companies and immediately re-
ceived criticism. However, the frequently announced adoption of the
doctrine by the California Supreme Court has made the question of
correctness of the decision academic.
Where the wife fails to revoke the gift as to one-half of the pro-
ceeds following the husband's death, she is deemed to have made a
gift to the named beneficiary to that extent. Where she appropri-
ately releases her community interest in a policy during the life of
both spouses, she has made an inter vivos gift. There is, however, a
significant difference in the amount of the gift in the two cases. In
the former situation the gift pertains to the face value of the policy
whereas the gift prior to the insured's death involves only the much
smaller replacement value.
The recognition by the California courts that the wife does have
substantial, probably vested, interests in a community life insurance
contract, and that by the same token the husband's interest in his
wife's one-half of the community property is only as her agent dur-
ing their joint lives, has important federal tax consequences. Upon
the death of the husband, even though the entire proceeds are pay-
able to his estate, the wife may claim one-half as her community
share free of tax. The same result follows where the husband names
a third person as beneficiary: only one-half of the proceeds will be
included in his gross estate. Under state law the decedent is the true
owner and has the incidents of ownership of no more than that por-
tion, even where the policy purports to vest in him powers over the
entire policy.
If it is desirable to avoid estate tax entirely at the death of the
husband it becomes necessary to shed incidents of ownership during
0 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923).
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his life. The most effective method is to make an irrevocable assign-
ment of all interest in the policy in the same way that a transfer
might be made of interests in other forms of property. Such an as-
signment may be made to an irrevocable trust, or directly to the
named beneficary, or to someone not previously named as benefi-
ciary. When such an assignment is made to the beneficiary, the right
to change beneficiaries having previously been reserved, the assignee
now acquires rights as lifetime owner of the policy, in sharp contrast
to his previous status as one with a mere expectancy during the in-
sured's life. A gift for federal gift tax purposes will have been made
by the husband in such case and, if the wife joins in the assignment
to a third person, each has made a lifetime gift of one-half the re-
placement value, not the face value. In this respect-the wide varia-
tion in lifetime values and values after death-life insurance differs
markedly from most other forms of property.
Another method of shedding incidents of ownership is to name a
beneficiary irrevocably. It must be remembered, however, that just
as in the case of an assignment, if community property is involved,
even the naming of a beneficiary irrevocably cannot be made effec-
tively in California by inter vivos gift without the written consent of
the wife unless she herself is the beneficiary. During the lifetime of
both husband and wife she can presumably revoke the "irrevocable"
designation and return the policy to the community. Furthermore,
at the death of the insured, she can claim one-half the proceeds.
Only by her written consent will her husband's designation of the
beneficiary be truly irrevocable where community property is in-
volved.
Care must be exercised to see that reversionary clauses in the pol-
icy do not exist, Section 2042 providing that the policy will still be
included in the insured's gross estate if the value of any reversionary
interest exceeds five per cent of the value of the policy immediately
prior to the insured's death.
The Tyre Case
In Tyre v. Aetna Life Insurance Company,"° the husband took out
insurance on his life, paid for it with community funds, and pro-
vided that upon his death his wife should receive an annuity based
on her life expectancy. If she failed to survive him by ten years the
monthly payments were to be divided among three daughters for
the balance of the ten year period. Such a guaranteed period is, of
course, frequently seen and makes good sense. The wife in this case,
LO 54 Cal. 2d 399, 353 P.2d 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1960).
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however, asserted her community property rights and requested pay-
ment'of the full face amount of the policy, $20,000 in cash, or in
the alternative, asked for $10,000 in cash, the wife's community
interest, and the remaining $10,000 in the annuity form provided
by the insured.
The insurance company in this case argued that the husband as
manager of the community property had the power during his life-
time to enter into this contract. A divided California Supreme Court
concluded that this was not a lifetime management problem but
rather a testamentary disposition and that the husband had power to
dispose of only one-half of the community property. It made no
difference that this was an insurance policy and not a formal will.
The court next concluded that the wife was forced to an election in
this case and that by claiming her $10,000 outright she had dis-
qualified herself as the beneficiary of her husband's half. Conse-
quently, she was entitled only to the $10,000. The husband's half
became payable to the three daughters, the secondary beneficiaries,
on an annuity basis measured by the wife's life.
Although the husband should be able to put his widow to an
election by appropriate provisions in an insurance policy just as he
might in a will, I find no evidence in this case that the husband in-
tended to do so. He did not explicitly specify that she was to have
no interest in his half if she elected to take her half outright, and I
believe she had a valid claim to an annuity interest in the husband's
half as well.
The lifetime management argument would appear to be valid if
the husband sets up an annuity rather than an outright distribution
of the proceeds for the benefit of the wife where no interest is given
to secondary beneficiaries. The Tyre case is similar to the life estate
in the wife, remainder to the children, arrangement and the husband
cannot deprive the wife of the complete interest in her half although
he should be able to provide for an annuity to the wife in lieu of
outright payment of the proceeds if her payments are not reduced by
virtue of guaranteed payments to secondary beneficiaries.
Life Insurance Proceeds
Life insurance policies may be made payable in several ways. Fre-
quently the proceeds are paid in a lump sum to an individual bene-
ficiary. This has all of the disadvantages of any other kind of prop-
erty left outright to a surviving spouse and many husbands prefer
the use of settlement options with the insurance company. Under
these options, the proceeds may be paid in installments or in a fixed
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amount for a fixed number of years or as a life annuity either with
or without a guaranteed period.
In some instances, the life insurance is paid directly to the in-
sured's estate in order to pass under the terms of the insured's will.
Such proceeds are, of course, subject to the claims of creditors and
may be subject to state inheritance taxes.
The life insurance trust is a device that is perhaps too frequently
overlooked. Under such an arrangement the trustee named as the
beneficiary collects the proceeds and invests the funds. Income and
principal are paid out according to the terms of the trust with many
resulting advantages.
All of the insured's policies can be administered as a unit and
the flexibility in a trust can be almost unlimited as contrasted with
insurance company settlement options. The trustee, furthermore, can
often have a much closer personal relationship with the beneficiary
than can the insurance company.
Flexibility in investment is also an important factor to consider.
Someone has said that prediction is difficult, particularly with refer-
ence to the future. Prediction of future economic conditions is im-
possible, but is not necessary if the insurance proceeds are placed in
trust with a reliable and capable trustee. The trust can also afford
necessary liquidity in the settlement of an estate. The trustee, for
example, can be authorized in his discretion to lend money to or
purchase assets from the estate. This is often highly desirable.
The advantage of life insurance in creating a definite amount of
liquid capital at death through purchase on the installment plan
during life has often been referred to. Sometimes neglected is the
equally important problem of determining the most effective meth-
ods of payment of the proceeds following death.
The Wife's Interest in Community Property Life Insurance
Having addressed groups in most of the eight community prop-
erty states in recent years, I have concluded that there is probably
more confusion with reference to the wife's interest in community
property life insurance than in any other aspect of community
property.
In the first place courts have stated repeatedly that there is no
property interest in life insurance. Such statements have their origin,
I believe, in cases around the turn of the century when, generally
speaking, there was nothing of value in life insurance policies dur-
ing lifetime. Almost all of the early policies provided only for term
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insurance, somewhat in the nature of fire insurance. Today most
policies probably have substantial lifetime values.
A second reason for the confusion in this area stems from the
failure to distinguish the contractual rights of an insurance company
as set forth in the policy from the property rights or the ownership
rights. The contractual rights deal with the beneficiary, the terms of
payment, whether outright or in installments, forfeiture rights, etc.
Companies selling life insurance in community property states often
ignore the fact that the wife may have property rights in the policy
in conflict with the various contractual provisions.
A third argument sometimes advanced is that if the wife pre-
deceases her husband her heirs should have no greater rights in the
community property life insurance than the wife herself had. It is
clear that the wife during lifetime cannot cancel the policy and
demand its cash surrender value or any part of it inasmuch as the
husband is the manager of the community property. At her death,
however, the situation is different. A life insurance policy can be
partitioned; the company can issue two distinct policies, both of
which will insure the life of the husband. The husband will own
one-half of the insurance and the individual who succeeds to the
wife's interest, if someone other than the husband, will own the
other half. It will no longer be community property. Compare 100
shares of General Motors stock purchased by the husband out of his
earnings. The wife may not, during their joint lives, have the stock
split into two 50-share certificates, short of divorce, and yet upon her
death if the wife leaves her interest to the children quite clearly they
can have the stock split. Community property life insurance should
be no different.
In the fourth place, many fail to distinguish between the rights of
a beneficiary and those of a co-owner. In separate property states the
wife can also be an owner or co-owner of a policy but this does not
happen as frequently as in a community property state where she
automatically becomes a co-owner. The wife has these rights of
ownership whether named as beneficiary or not.
Fifth among the reasons why there has been confusion in this area
is that insurance policies frequently present complicated problems of
valuation. The tax authorities and the courts tend to limit these
values to two, either the cash surrender value (terminal reserve is
the more accurate term) or the face value at death. There can, how-
ever, be many other values and this leads to complications in under-
standing the nature of the property interest in insurance. Term insur-
ance, for example, owned by an individual known to have incurable
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cancer can be very valuable and yet the policy would be a difficult
one to evaluate.
In California if the wife does not leave a will, or if she has a will
which leaves everything to the husband, there is normally no prob-
lem concerning her interest in community property life insurance. In
such case it is clear today that a federal estate tax will be payable
at the time of death of the wife, based on the lifetime value of her
half interest in the policy, and later the full proceeds will be taxed
at the death of the insured husband. Consideration should be given
to leaving the wife's interest in the policy to the children or to some
third person in order to avoid the tax on half of the proceeds at the
death of the husband. I suspect that in many cases, unless her in-
terest in community property life insurance is specifically mentioned,
there may be a tendency to overlook this type of property in her
estate even though the wife purports to dispose of all her property
by will.
PITFALL NUMBER 9: PREMATURE GIFTS TO MINORS
When I last spoke to you, I talked about this pitfall where tax
avoidance has played a far too important part. Although I believe
that clients, and certainly attorneys, are more sophisticated today
and realize the shortsightedness in many cases of making outright
gifts to minors for the sole purpose of saving taxes, there is no doubt
but that our tax laws still tempt many parents to make unwise gifts
of this nature. Let us take a brief look at some of these dangers.
Although minors may own property outright, state laws frequently
require that a guardian be appointed. This is especially true where
the asset is one that requires active management. The guardian is
necessary not only to protect the minor against indiscretion or lack
of judgment, but also to make possible the transaction of business
that third persons would not otherwise enter into. Some assets do
not always require guardianship. For example, a savings account or
a life insurance policy or a United States Savings Bond might be
owned outright by the minor although a guardian may be required
if it becomes necessary to do something with reference to such prop-
erty prior to majority. In the case of inheritance by a minor, the
court may require a guardian in order to receive the property.
What are the disadvantages of a guardianship? The guardian is
generally limited in powers of investment. He must generally post
bond and must make regular reports to the court. The guardian is
usually limited in the use of income and principal for the minor,
and, again, there is frequently the necessity of court supervision. But
far more serious is the fact that when the child becomes of age the
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guardianship terminates. The books are filled with instances of
tragedies resulting from children receiving unfettered control over
property at too early an age. A further difficulty may arise in the
event of the death of a child. Distribution under state law will fre-
quently be contrary to the desires of the parent. Today some of the
difficulties of guardianship can be avoided by outright gifts to mi-
nors made to a custodian for the minor's benefit. Rather broad laws
now permit the custodian to exercise broader discretion than the
guardian, but the major difficulty, that of termination of the protec-
tion at age twenty-one, still remains.
The answer in many instances is the placing of property in trust
for the minor. This can be either an inter vivos or a testamentary
trust. The trust can, of course, provide for great flexibility, not pos-
sible in a guardianship or a custodianship, and this flexibility can
extend to investment powers as well as the disposition of income
and capital. The trust need not terminate at age twenty-one and very
frequently it is desirable to have it terminate in installments at more
advanced ages. Provisions for the death of the child can be made
and great flexibility can be possible with reference to different mem-
bers of the family. Possible savings in income taxes should not be
overlooked. Under a trust arrangement, part of the income can be
taxed to the child and the balance to the trust. Thus there can be an
additional splitting of income for tax purposes beyond the removal
of income from the parents' higher tax brackets.
PITFALL NUMBER 10: IMPROPER USE OF PENSION OR PROFIT-
SHARING PLANS
If a client is fortunate enough to participate in a pension or profit-
sharing plan that qualifies under Section 401 he should make certain
that the profits are not made payable to his estate. If they are not
made so payable they can escape estate tax and in recent years sub-
stantial values have grown up in thousands of such plans. Not only
can this interest escape tax at the death of the husband but if made
payable to the wife in a proper fashion it can escape tax at her sub-
sequent death. The husband should think twice before making these
benefits payable outright to the wife, thus rendering them taxable at
her death. No marital deduction is available to him, the marital
deduction applying only in the case of property included in the hus-
band's gross estate. It would thus seem wise to have the interest
from a qualified plan paid under an annuity arrangement, leaving
no value at the wife's death, or paid in a lump sum to an irrevocable
trust with life income only to the wife.
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PITFALL NUMBER 11: NEGLECT OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
The most significant estate tax deductions are the marital and
charitable deductions. John D. Rockefeller III left an estate of $80,-
000,000. The federal estate tax and the New York estate tax would
have aggregated almost $70,000,000 if these two deductions had not
been available. The total tax actually paid was approximately $200,-
000. This result was accomplished by dividing the estate into two
parts, one of which went into a marital deduction trust for the bene-
fit of the wife and the other into a charitable trust with members of
the family as trustees. The family was able to retain almost complete
control of the family fortune and yet escape with almost no estate
tax.
PITFALL NUMBER 12: UNDERVALUATION OF PROPERTY
In the desire to minimize estate tax, property in the gross estate
is sometimes placed at a lower figure than necessary. There are a
number of reasons why an assertion of a higher value, where the
value is debatable as it often is, may be desirable. This is particularly
true where the saving in income tax may exceed the additional estate
tax. Estate tax valuation will generally establish the stepped-up basis
for later taxes on gains and for depredation. High valuation should
be considered, of course, where the estate is under $60,000 and no
federal estate tax is due. Where the items in question are depre-
ciable or where the item is inventory and the estate tax rate will be
less than the ordinary income tax rate of the intended beneficiary,
consideration should be given to a higher value. The same may be
true if the property qualifies for the marital deduction, if the item
in question has been bequeathed to charity or if the beneficiary in-
tends to make a deductible charitable gift and his income tax rate is
higher than the estate tax rate. There may also be other situations
where a minimum value for estate tax purposes will be more costly
in the long run.
PITFALL NUMBER 13: FAILURE TO REVIEW AN ESTABLISHED PLAN
There are many obvious reasons to review one's estate plan-the
occasion of entering into a partnership or purchasing a business, the
purchase of a new home, the buying of life insurance policies, the
birth of children in the family, divorces, and other events. But sepa-
rate and apart from such occasions when one quite naturally thinks
about his financial picture, one should make it a practice to take an
overall view at fairly frequent intervals. The extent to which a
change in the value of one's business or other assets, gradual changes
in his family, changes in the tax laws, to mention but a few, can
alter the picture often is overlooked. Planning for the future is in all
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respects a never-ending task and to consider the task finished at any
point in one's life is to incur the danger of leaving a structure that
is unsound for the family's future.
CONCLUSION
It might be well to remind you that an attorney is not bound to
stand idly by, having once prepared a will or otherwise set up an
estate plan, and watch future changes, coupled with the procrastina-
tion of the client, impair the value of the plan that was set up. As
stated in Opinion Number 210 of the Ethics Committee of the
American Bar Association:
Many events transpire between the date of making a will and the
death of the testator. The legal significance of such occurrences is
often of serious consequence, of which the testator may not be
aware, and the importance of calling the attention of the testator
thereto is manifest. It is our opinion that, where the lawyer has no
reason to believe that he has been supplanted by another lawyer, it
is not only his right, but it might even be his duty to advise his
client of any change of fact or law which might defeat the client's
testamentary purpose as expressed in the will.
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